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Introduction  
The Responsibility of Awkwardness 
Nicolette Bragg 
Cornell University 
The thought of the limit has in its genetics the questioning of time and place. 
The essays in this collection, African Thinking and/at Its Limits, demonstrate 
this essential interrogation (how time and space both belong to a certain 
critical modality); their address of (and at) the limits of African thinking 
confronts the potential limitedness of spatial and temporal understandings. 
The limit signals the very reach(es) of time and place, even as it enables the 
possibility of territory, control, management, and measure. Possibility itself, 
the very provocation of the limit, can itself be formulated in terms of time 
and place—What can (yet) be done? Where is it possible to go? Where do we 
go from here? The limit signifies both expiration, the farthest point a 
thinking can take one, and consolidation, the demarcation and establishment 
of a territory. These questions of time and place are, as such and for these 
very reasons, bound up in any thinking of Africa. This is clear from the 
themes addressed by the contributions to this collection, not the least of 
which are the historicity of the concepts commonly used to assess or explain 
state crisis, the hangovers of colonial paradigms, and the difficulty in 
thinking, addressing, and analyzing the crisis of the postcolony.  
 As each contribution examines the limitations of a common gauge of 
Africa, they demonstrate and foreground the interplay of time and place in 
relation to thinking. At issue, they engage with the failures and flaws of 
productions of place and the missteps of representation. Pierre-Philippe 
Fraiture, in this vein, addresses the dualisms that channel the persistent 
belief in African difference; Kasereka Kavwahirehi confronts the normativity 
of recent well-received counters to afropessimism (such as Patrick Chabal’s 
and Jean-Pascal Daloz’s Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument in 
Africa). At issue in almost all is the limitations of a way of thinking that 
flattens out, obscures, and effaces the particularities of specific places and 
realities. Temporality provides one avenue of rebuttal. V-Y Mudimbe’s 
notion of “reprendre” counters the fatalism of cultural “métissage” 
(Fraiture), while Leopold Senghor’s doubled, creative grasp of past and 
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future enable his own productive formulation of assimilation (as John 
Drabinski shows through the 1945 essay, “Assimilation and Association”). 
The time and place of the limit is entangled with the time and place of 
African thinking, raising the question of Africa’s relationship to the limit. 
Why are the questions of Africa so often those of the limits of thinking? 
What is the relevance of Africa to the thinking of the limit?  
 The contributions of this volume suggest that what is at stake is not 
only the proper place and time of thinking, but, more pertinently, the 
improper, and what one makes of it. Impropriety is the point of entry, for 
one does not dwell at the limit. (Although dwelling entails the thought of 
the limit, the confrontation with the limits of established accounts of place 
and time.) The limit is rather the place of exhaustion, depletion, uncertainty, 
and the threat of breakdown. The limit is the unfamiliar and the 
discomforting. To use the obsolete, there is something awk about thinking at 
the limit. Thinking at the limit takes the appearance of being, as the 
dictionary defines it, “directed the other way”, “untoward”, “out-of-the-
way.” Awk, the thought of the limit, reorienting the question of the stranger, 
engages not with hospitality or transcendence, not with the extension of 
thought, not even with the journey or the departure, but with the way in 
which one’s thinking calls attention to the operation of the limit. The limit, in 
short, is the place for and of awkwardness.  
 Awkwardness, rather than simply denoting a lack of skill, ease, 
confidence, or competence, agility or grace, is that category of belonging that 
calls attention to the limit. A contemporary catchword riveted to the 
question of time and place, awkwardness takes up the problematic of the 
limit. Awkwardness, in other words, is not only a manifestation of newness 
to or unfamiliarity of an environment, or a stilted negotiation of the rules 
and relationship of a place or setting, it is not simply ungainliness or 
gracelessness. Not directly opposed to mastery, belonging, or propriety, but 
recalling them nonetheless, not simply a sign of entrance, not simply 
unconventionality, awkwardness enables a reconsideration of the limits to 
arrival and accommodation.  
 Ta-Nehisi Coates is perhaps the most dedicated and well-known 
theorist of awkwardness.  J.M. Coetzee, appropriately, given the kinds of 
difficulties his work raises, is a close second. Coates and Coetzee each write 
somewhat obsessively about awkwardness, countering their careful prose 
with the awkwardness of (their) being. Their agenda is slightly different—
Coates’ interest in awkward is pedagogical and political; Coetzee’s is 
ethical—but they both stipulate awkwardness not as a predicament of 
dispossession but as a response to social injustice. They do not bemoan or 
rationalize awkwardness. Awkwardness, their own or another’s, is a 
sensible reminder of exclusion and of the conditions of being at ease.  
Awkwardness is, indeed, inextricably tied up for both with their shared 
focus on the problem of how to live in the world. Coates pursuing the racial 
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injustice and the threat to black lives in the United States, Coetzee 
questioning the possibility of being at home in the postcolonial. 
In his columns for The Atlantic, Coates builds another life for 
awkwardness. In these columns, he dwells on his own awkwardness, 
drawing upon it to critique systems of privilege. His description of his time 
in France with his family accentuates his awkwardness—“We hit the ground 
running with no time to look pretty or cool or like anything more than what 
we are”—and he clarifies that this is emblematic of his life—“We have 
bumbled into everything we’ve ever gotten, smacked into it sideways and 
awkward and shameless.”1 He litters his writing with his clumsiness. France 
for him is the place of “bumble”, “stumble”, “mishandling verbs”, 
“fumbling pronouns”, and “wrecking whole grammars.”2 Awkwardness is 
crucial to his assessment of how he moves through the world. He 
emphasizes it, as he surveys the linguistic wreckage his encounter with the 
phenomenon of the French language has wrought. If “the game is rigged,” 
as he puts it, he counters not with skill or dexterity, but by way of 
ungainliness.  
In addition, Coates defends awkwardness as the possibility of learning. 
Awkwardness has become the very mark of Coates’ thinking. To learn and 
develop, he both reassuringly and exasperatedly insists, “You must have an 
awkward phrase.”3 Awkwardness, indeed, compels thought and 
participates in his politics. He urges diversity for the awkwardness it 
generates, in this case, a necessary awkwardness that compels self-
awareness: “If you are not around people who will look at you like you are 
crazy when you make stupid claims about other people’s experiences, then 
you tend to keep saying stupid things about other people’s experiences.”4 
Stupidity, in this case, denotes a disregard for the limitations of one’s own 
knowledge. “Better to be awkward,” he ends, “than stupid.” Here, the only 
thing that distinguishes stupidity from awkwardness is the space in which it 
is appears. Stupidity is the prolonged absence of the possibility of 
awkwardness, a willful evasion of awkwardness. Although he aligns 
stupidity with awkwardness—a parallel otherwise absent in his thinking—
he nevertheless celebrates it for what it reveals about knowledge, privilege, 
and learning. Awkwardness signals for Coates the exposure to a view of 
things that is not your own.  It is the sign of an opening to one’s own 
limitations; it is a commitment to thinking those limits. It reminds that the 
ease and smoothness of one’s speech depends on the bounds and exclusivity 
of one’s space. It suggests that you have let in that which disrupts the even 
terrain upon which it is easy not to think.  Coates’ is a pointed resistance to 
the desire for and the praise of fluidity and ease.  
Coetzee’s 2009 Summertime, on the other hand, builds a life out of 
awkwardness.5 A fictional biography of the late author J.M. Coetzee, 
Summertime is awkward to the extreme. It unreservedly generates and 
exposes awkwardness. Summertime rejects the author’s prose and 
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publications, and takes as its subject his life. It cuts off his body from his 
writing. Without writing—without mediation—that body is graceless, 
ungainly, and grotesque. Summertime presents the author as, in the words of 
the women whose stories constitute much of the work, an “automaton” (53), 
“disembodied” (198), not “constituted to fit into or be fitted into” (82). A title 
for the researched biography is suggested: “The Wooden Man.” Summertime 
presents the author, the protagonist, as the “man dancing naked,” devoid 
even of the constraint and control of his writing (184). Awkwardness is front 
and center. The author is characterized by his discomfort: “He was not at 
ease among people who were at ease. The ease of others made him ill at 
ease” (231).  
Summertime foregrounds and develops a trope very familiar to 
Coetzee’s fiction: that of the awkward, authoritative white male. Coetzee 
marries self-contempt to those characters able to blunder through lives 
founded upon colonialism.”  Disgrace6 and Waiting for the Barbarians7 come to 
mind. The desire and power of David Lurie and the Magistrate betray the 
narcissism of their flawed comprehension of their place in the world. Their 
presence is always qualified by the form of their flesh. This awkwardness—
the clear sense of characters of the figure they cut in their pursuits—has as a 
colonial backdrop. Lurie misjudges his allure and authority in post-
apartheid South Africa; the Magistrate looms over the body and life of a 
rescued prisoner girl at the outpost of empire. Rather than confession or self-
indulgent criticism, Summertime reflects the nature of Coetzee’s ongoing 
resistance to the possibility of postcolonial livability.  
The focus of Summertime is the possibility of belonging. Even as 
Summertime relates the disconnection of its protagonist, it stresses both his 
love for the land (more specifically, for the Karoo farm on which he spends 
his boyhood) and his refusal to make any claim for belonging (“Our 
presence was grounded in a crime, namely colonial conquest, perpetuated 
by apartheid. Whatever the opposite is of native or rooted, that was what we 
felt ourselves to be,” his colleague relates (210)). Awkwardness, Summertime 
suggests, is the only recourse of the colonialist inhabiting the postcolony. To 
be awkward is to be neither host nor guest. It is to be neither master nor 
stranger. It is to fail at belonging, persistently. Coetzee makes of 
awkwardness an ethics, a mode of being that registers non-belonging in 
one’s home, that resists any claim to ease or space. He establishes 
awkwardness as a resistance to and condemnation of belonging. 
Awkwardness is the utterly humorless reflection on the fragile fabrication of 
one’s belonging. This is Coetzee’s ethical stance, the only being-with he 
allows himself: to be ill at ease with the ease of others. 
Although they do so from different perspectives, Coates and Coetzee 
each examine the responsibility of awkwardness, or the awkwardness of 
responsibility. For Coetzee, awkwardness emerges as a non-exclusive 
assertion of presence or accounting for presence. For Coates, awkwardness 
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adjudicates not presence, but the accepted measures and bounds of place. 
Coates and Coetzee give to the social concern of awkwardness—the societal 
question of etiquette, embarrassment, conformity—a political resonance and 
relevance.  
This, given the theoretical potential of awkwardness, is not surprising. 
Awkwardness depends on a prescribed narrative or program, a sense of 
how things should be. Awkwardness measures the relationships between 
things and people. It asserts the importance of the question of how to be part 
of a community, of how to be among others. Awkwardness depends on the 
limits of a space, of its confinement. Its appearance reminds of these limits. 
Indeed, awkwardness is the break that calls attention to the contingency of 
the rules. Awkwardness raises awareness of often ignored spaces between 
objects and people, glaring gaps that upset the rhythm of words, that trip 
tongues and steps. It recognizes that the world looms differently around 
each of us. Awkwardness is simply a non-conformance to the established 
alignment of time and space. Theorizations of awkwardness makes being at 
ease suspect. It raises the question of what might be missing. The absence of 
awkwardness triggers the question of exclusion. Hence the urgency of 
thinking and critique, the need to both risk and create awkwardness that 
might demonstrate the shortfalls and errors of apprehensions of place. 
Awkwardness denotes a moving among, but with a slight tilt or bend. 
The awkward body seems new to a space, as if they have not been together 
much. To be awkward is to be moving in a world slightly to the side of the 
one in which everyone else operates. There is a time lag. It is movement at a 
slightly different tempo. It is the sign of a disconnection from an 
apprehension of place and time that signals and shows the contingency of 
this connection and its potential exclusivity. Moreover, awkwardness 
gestures to the possibility of an unexamined connection, an unconventional 
alignment of time and space. Awkwardness, in other words, is simply a non-
conformance to the accepted alignment of time and place. Employed to 
signal social ineptitude, the theoretical potential and the conditions of 
awkwardness highlights the way in which the limit calls itself into question, 
interrupting the patterns and habits and thought that lead to its 
establishment. Awkwardness then does have a relationship to both ethics 
and thought. Awkwardness calls into question the smooth fit of time and 
place. At its most promising, as a readjustment of time and place, 
awkwardness is thought. 
Each of the essays of this volume inclines to the production of 
awkwardness. Engaging with pressing issues of livability whose address 
continues to be stymied with by now haggard colonial conceptual baggage, 
as well as with current debates in African philosophy and politics, these 
essays are attuned to the difficulties of thinking any place and of the distrust 
that should accompany any attempt that proceeds too easily. They raise 
hills, create friction, and destabilize terrain in order to call attention to the 
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problems of popular, often skilled discourses of Africa. These essays jam the 
fluency of discourses about Africa, calling attention to what such discourse 
must flatten out or ignore in order to flow. Whether it is to call attention to 
the myopia of the Failed States Index (Abushar)—Sudan, one of the 
awkward states, calls attention to the exertions, contingencies, and 
interdependencies of sovereignty and survival—or to the blindness of 
intellectually popular theories of African society to their own ideological 
foundations (Kavwahirehi, Olúfémi Táíwò), they set the stage for 
awkwardness, the first, necessary sign of thinking that marks an entrance 
into the situations we address. They interrupt, in other words, complacent 
thinking that sets the terrain even as it navigates it.  
This is evident in Fraiture’s reading of V-Y. Mudimbe’s “Rependre: 
Enunciations and Strategies in Contemporary African Arts,” bracketed 
between an analysis of the Présence Africaine-commissioned 1953 
documentary Les Statues meurent aussi and its 2013 reprisal, video artist 
Duncan Campbell’s It for Others. The constellation shows the persistence of 
colonial paradigms of Africa dependent on notions of difference, 
homogeneity, and uniqueness, all of which view any change or 
transformation in cultural production as its death. Mudimbe’s “Rependre” 
articulates a mode of productive influence—a re-appraisal, a reprisal 
according to context—that “disrupt[s] the rigid historicity (pre-colonial, 
colonial, post-colonial) that for a very long time prevailed among scholars of 
European imperialism and art historians” and that upsets the dualisms that 
governed thought on African art.  
The concerns of Richard Pithouse’s essay are precisely those that 
provoke Coetzee’s and Coates’ insistence on awkwardness. Pithouse 
engages with the philosophical dimensions of praxis, and with the political 
situation that prohibits the social organization and interaction that would 
enable the “future-oriented politics” his essay invokes and turns toward. A 
key issue is the alienation of intellectuals and academics from popular 
struggles and the liberal restriction of reason. Pithouse, however, draws on 
the thinker who blows the question of awkwardness out of the water. Franz 
Fanon dispenses with the thought of awkwardness as he makes of the limit 
the realm in which one thinks and is. It is perhaps for this reason that the 
continued relevance of Fanon, as Pithouse argues, marks the “limit to 
political thought,” indicative as this relevance is of the absence of “a 
compelling emancipatory vision” fifty years after his death. The limit calls 
for Fanon and recalls Fanon. To transcend Fanon, to transcend the limit, one 
must take him “seriously.” 
 Jean-Paul Martinon provides another view of ethical awkwardness. An 
awkward ethics is a commitment to the apprehension of the stabilizations 
and exclusions that attend speech. “Between Earth and Sky” examines the 
mono-logic time of the thinking “I” that inevitably objectifies Africa, 
relegating it to “a single time with a past and a future.” To resist this mono-
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logic, Jean-Paul Martinon writes his essay as an address to Africa: “Africa, 
who are you?” It is an address that turns the conversation away from one’s 
own comfort. “Between Earth and Sky” turns to the post-philosophy of 
Ivorian Bourahima Ouattara to de-center the “I” of thought. Ouattara’s 
reprisal of Martin Heidegger’s fourfold relates thinking to dwelling, a term 
that does not designate home or house but that nevertheless depends upon 
their relation to situatedness and place. Presenting thought as dwelling 
situates the otherwise central “I” as merely one among gods, earth, and sky. 
The address, although it resembles Derrida’s questioning of the stranger, is 
not precisely a gesture of hospitality. It marks rather the departure from 
home, the entrance into dwelling that encompasses not only one’s own 
“apprehension in time-place” but the extensions and limits of earth and sky 
and the unanticipated, unpredictable appearances of the gods.  
Martinon’s address un-writes the authority of the essay, disclaiming its 
origination in the author. Awkwardness is the question of the privilege of 
participation, the inevitable betrayal of any speech, the violent inscriptions 
of language. It is a refusal to be at ease and an openness to discomfort. 
Awkwardness reminds of the contingency of belonging and the work of the 
limit. As such, it has its own poetics, a gentle, but insistent, impropriety. An 
awareness and rejection of the temporality of the game, rather than simply 
its rules. Only superficially a sign of mistiming and unfamiliarity, 
awkwardness is that thinking that encapsulates the rewards and risks of the 
limit: the risk of discomfort, the promise of thinking, the disruption of 
complacency. The contributions to this volume risked the promise of 
thinking without effacing the discomfort of awkwardness. The agility and 
generosity of their thought, their accommodation, provide the time and 
space in which to think. They allow even the space to be awkward. It is, in 
the end, the space of the possible.   
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